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"Costa Rica: The Conflict over 
Stabilization and Neutrality, 1983-1984" 
The past year was one of uneasy stability for the Costa Rican economy, 
with little in the way of political innovation or change internally. In 
foreign affairs, Costa Rica pulled back somewhat from its openly hostile 
attitude toward the Sandinista regime, to the evident dismay and chagrin of 
the Reagan administration and its Central American strategists. To be sure, 
these trends were all relative. Economic stability could best be seen in 
comparison with the utterly disastrous 1981-1982 experience of massive 
devalu ation and runaway inflation. Even so, unemployment remained high 
through much of 1983 and there was a radical increase in the internal poverty 
index since the crisis began in 1980, despite lowered inflation and exchange 
rate stability during 1983. These positive developments appeared to be owing 
more to the local government's ability to negotiate easier debt repayment 
terms internationally, and obtain major aid monies from the United States, 
than to its success with pro-export and import-restrictive policies at home. 
Thus, the economic achievement of 1983, stabilization, may well be more of a 
precarious holding action in the present strained circumstances than a long- 
range solution to the country's economic woes. 
Costa Rican politics were at a low ebb in this the second year of the 
administration of Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez (1982-1986), well over two years 
in advance of the 1986 Presidential elections. Perhaps only the Central 
Committee "coup" which deposed the first and only (52 years tenure) Secretary 
General of the pro-Soviet "Popular Vanguard Party," Manuel Mora Valverde, in 
December 1983, led to a ripple in local political waters. The majoritarian 
parties, Liberaci6n Nacional and Unidad Social Cristiana (the 1978 "Unidad" 
coalition reborn in 1984), began to witness the ritual of Presidential 
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precandidacies and rumors of same, with a view toward the serious campaigning 
ahead this year and next. 
Internationally, the Monge administration tilted toward the Contadora 
group's positions and away from its earlier warm relations with the Reagan 
administration and its Central American policy. This could be seen first in 
the removal of the virulently anti-Sandinista Foreign Minister, Fernando Volio 
Jimbnez, in November 1983, and subsequently in its much publicized "permanent 
declaration of active neutrality" (see documents section). Of greatest 
practical significance, the government assumed a much more active role in the 
interdiction and deportation of Edbn Pastora's Alianza Revolucionaria 
Democrfitica (ARDE) fighters, along with a number of foreign mercenaries in 
transit. This, combined with the end of the year rejection of a United States 
offer of military "engineers" to build roads along the sensitive border with 
Nicaragua, seemed to be sending a clear message to the U.S.-backed anti- 
Sandinista forces that Costa Rica would no longer go along with their openly 
confrontationist strategies. Relations with Nicaragua remained very strained 
to be sure, but the Monge government appeared to be disassociating itself from 
counterrevolutionary forces in the area, owing both to intraparty disputes 
over earlier cooperation with such forces, and out of fear of the consequences 
of a larger war on its border. How long this policy might be sustainable, 
given the government's considerable financial dependence on the Reagan 
administration, is yet an open question. Indeed, as this writing proceeds 
(May 1984) yet another attempt is being made by the Reagan team to woo Costa 
Rica away from its newly reaffirmed neutrality and toward the confrontationist 
line of its Honduran and Salvadoran allies (see below for further details). 
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COSTA RICA' S ECONOMIC DEBACLE 
Costa Rica's disastrous experience of 1981-1982 was the result of both 
long term structural imbalances and short term, conjunctural problems and 
misjudgments. Symptomatic of the former were endemic deficit financing and 
reliance on private and public capital inflows to cover balance of payments 
shortfalls resulting from inflated consumer import bills, the proliferation of 
poorly coordinated and semi-autonomous public institutions supported by 
central government revenues, and the subsidizing of an inefficient and import 
dependent local industry protected under Central American Common Market or 
local tariff legislation. The buildup of these structural tensions would have 
eventually led to a crisis regardless of external, conjunctural trends. 
However, the disastrous downturn in these conditions since the late 1970s led 
to the explosive crisis situation of the recent past. The generalization of 
warfare throughout the Central American region both made a shambles of the 
once prosperous Common Market trade network and frightened away any potential 
foreign private investment capital. Moveover, the post-1979 international 
credit and interest rate spiral, along with generalized inflation, battered 
the local economy mercilessly. Add to this the inept and obstinate monetary 
policy of the Carazo Odio administration (1978-1982) in resisting devaluation, 
borrowing indiscriminately, and printing baseless currency as a last resort, 
and the stage was set for disaster. And the disaster would not be delayed, as 
Carazo and his team desperately hoped, until a new administration might take 
office. In the face of an external debt which spiraled from $800 million in 
1979 to over $4 billion in 1983, and deficit spending which reached some 17% 
of gross domestic product in 1980, the economy collapsed along with the 
exchange rate, beginning in late 1980.l By March 1982 the national currency, 
the colb, had declined from 8.6 to the dollar to 65, eventually stabilizing 
after mid-1982 in the 45-50 range, an effective devaluation of some 500%. 
Inflation during 1982 was officially pegged at 82%, but likely exceeded 
100%. From October/November 1981 to a like period of 1982 the gross domestic 
product fell by some 11.5% and prospects appeared grim for the future. 2 
Unemployment reached nearly ten percent by the end of 1982 and all payments 
were suspended on the foreign debt from August 1981 to July 1982. 
The Monge administration took office in May 1982 and began a process of 
stabilization, the results of which are only now becoming clear. Central to 
the stabilization plan was the reestablishment of external creditworthiness, 
first through partial resumption of debt servicing since July 1982 and, more 
importantly, by means of a succession of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
agreements signed since December of that year. Throughout 1983 Costa Rica was 
able to keep itself generally within the IMF-imposed limits, thanks in no 
small part to United States aid totaling some $350 million, of a total foreign 
capital inflow of upwards of $500 million, compared to only $800 million in 
export  revenue^.^ Prospects for continued economic stabilization, much less 
recovery, appear to depend heavily upon both continued U.S. aid and compliance 
with increasingly unpopular IMF guidelines. While the "bitterness" of the 
IMF-supplied medicine is clear, its effect upon the newly stable patient's 
chances for recovery remains the subject of contention. 
Stabilization meant not only exchange rate stability but also an 
inflation rate officially reported at 11% for 1983, a decline in the open 
unemployment rate to some 5.5%, and, for the first time in three or four 
years, a nearly 1% increase in the gross national product.4 These figures 
compare rather favorably with the 1982 figures of 82% inflation, 9.4% 
unemployment, and -11% in GNP. However, Costa Rita's slight increase in GNP, 
to approximately $4.65 billion, came about despite the continued decline 
light of the 500% devaluation. Revenue from exports declined some 11.4% in 
1982 and nearly 20% in 1983, to a paltry $800 million. Even in their most 
optimistic scenarios, officials foresee a return to 1980 export levels only 
during 1984-1985 (about $1 billion per year).5 
This poor export performance has been particulary worrisome to the Monge 
administration planners who clearly envisoned the devaluation sparking a non- 
traditional export-led recovery. Moreover, national industrial production was 
particularly devestated, falling 7.5% by value in 1982 and reflecting the 
paralization of the Central American trade for which much of local industry 
had produced. The only industrial sector somewhat immune to the regional 
depression were the U. S.-oriented textile "draw-back" plants, employing some 
15,000 workers with a capital investment of some 2.75 billion colones by 
1982.~ 
The surprisingly negative export performance has confounded the new 
administration's technocrats and has dashed their hopes for a rapid recovery 
after a brief interlude of IMF-prescribed austerity. Thus, political and 
economic debate has refocused upon the question of how best to reactivate the 
sluggish local economy. No longer do the export-led proponents have the field 
unopposed within the administration, and its ongoing relations with the IMF 
reflect this. While the IMF remains committed to austerity and export-led 
solutions, local political groupings, including occasionally the president 
himself, appear to be relying on a public sector injection of funds, whether 
through deficit financing or external aid, to reactivate a lethargic local 
economy whose traditional agricultural exports face extremely inelastic 
consumer markets abroad. This debate and policy oscillation has characterized 
much of the post-stabilization period of 1983-1984. 
BEYOND STABILIZATION: COSTA RICA'S TUG OF WAR WITH THE IMF 
Even before President Monge signed the first letter of intent with the 
IMF in December 1982, his administration had begun to test the fiscal limits 
of the agreement. The 1983 public sector budget deficit, as first envisoned 
in the September 1982 outline, far exceeded the 4.5% of GNP allowed by the 
IMF. Whereas the IMF target for overall spending by the central government 
was 18 billion colones, the first outline contemplated spending 22.3 
billion. Eventually the IMF guidelines were met, and then some, reducing 
deficit spending as a percentage of GNP from 12%, assuming a 22 billion colbn 
budget overall, to less than 2% (according to President Monge only 1.8 billion 
colones beyond revenues were expended during 1 9 8 3 ) ~ ~  This compared to levels 
of 17% in 1980, 13% in 1981, and 9.5% in 1982.~ Moveover, the IMF further 
pushed for a level of only 2% in 1984, while local officials considered 3% a 
realis tic figure. 
The IMF goals were achieved during 1983 by a progressive elimination of 
pervasive consumer subsidies and by massive infusions of U.S. aid and 
multilateral credit bailouts. Export revenues, however, continued to decline, 
along with direct foreign private investment, and the administration's much 
vaunted plan to eliminate 30,000 of the nearly 150,000 public sector jobs9 
backfired as Monge actually added some 6,000 new jobs during the depth of the 
1982-1983 crisis.'' Thus, stabilization came at the cost of some degree of 
austerity, tempered by the good fortune of abundant external resources, but 
both export performance and public sector staffing suggested that little 
structural change had been effected. 
Buoyed by this first semester respite from exchange rate and price 
instability, and concerned with continued economic sluggishness, the Monge 
administration presented at year's end a mammoth budget outline for the public 
sector in 1984 of some 25 billion colones, perhaps 13-15 billion of which made 
up the deficit. These levels of spending would have represented 12.5% and up 
to 7.5% of GNP,respectively, over twice the deficit level acceptable to the 
IMF.'~ In some respects, this was a political ploy designed to placate public 
sector political supporters and establish an aggressive bargaining position 
vis-a-vis both the IMF and a National Assembly to be pressured to raise taxes 
to close such an alarming deficit. After lengthy consultations, the Monge 
administration was able to pass a National Einergency Law, in March 1984, 
designed to reduce the projected 13.5 billion col6n deficit to 5.5 billion, 
well within IMF guidelines, through new taxes on imports and corporate income, 
a forced contribution to the central government of 1.17 billion colones during 
1984 by 18 public sector "autonomous" agencies, and such things as new tourist 
and passport fees. At the same time, 12 year income tax and import duty 
exemptions were granted to non-traditional exporters. 12 
Faced with Costa Rican recalcitrance, the IMF (and U. S .-AID) twice 
suspended funds (November 1983 and April 1984) pending compliance with its 
guidelines. In November the IMF wanted a 1% tax on foreign exchange 
remittances replaced by a tax on imports, while in April it insisted upon a 
15% increase in gasoline prices and the effective restriction of all foreign 
exchange transactions to the Central Bank. l3 In addition, the IMF continued 
to monitor public sector spending to insure compliance with the agreed upon 
deficit limits. Of particular significance in this regard was the 
administration's promise to begin paying some 500 million colones in salary 
increases to the teachers' union in March 1984.14 Without solid sources to 
finance this erogation, this was sure to breach the IMF deficit spending 
limit. 
Underlying this tug of war over public sector spending levels is an 
increasingly pessimistic, and nationalistic, assessment of the economic 
recovery on the part of the Monge administration's technocratic team. Whereas 
Minister of Exports Mario Carvajal had confidently predicted in early 1983 
that exports would surge from $900 million in 1983 (they fdll short badly) to 
over $1,500 million in 1986,15 by February 1984 he was joining with the new 
Minister of National Planning, the economist Juan Manuel Villasuso, in 
cautioning that there would be no substantial recovery during the Monge 
presidency.16 The two officials argued that with export revenues stagnant at 
about $1 billion or less per year (1984), barely able to cover the bill for 
essential imports, part of the nearly $500 million in capital inflow being 
used currently to service the foreign debt would have to be increased and/or 
diverted to stimulating local economic growth. IMF opposition to such public 
sector "pump priming" was a virtual certainty, unless external aid monies 
could be increased accordingly. The negative attitude of the Reagan 
administration toward supporting public sector spending with foreign aid, 
short of a local equivalent of the sort of defense buildup which justifies its 
own deficits, would likely outdo that of the IMF. That local planners should 
have moved from the rose-tinged glasses view of an export-led economic rebound 
to pessimistic diagnoses and interventionist policies so quickly only 
highlights what is likely to remain the focus of economic policy debates for 
months if not years to come: an IMF austerity-based recovery versus a return 
to neo-keynesian public sector paliatives in the face of the former's 
perceived high cost and limited short term success in improving the local 
economy. 
THE SOCIAL COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STABILIZATION 
The immediate result of the economic debacle of 1981-1982 was the sudden 
impoverishment of the vast majority of the Costa Rican population. By early 
1983 average industrial wages were on a par with Haiti, at a level of less 
than $0.20 per hour, and fully 71% of families in January 1983 were found to 
have incomes below the poverty level for basic food costs, much less able to 
pay spiraling rentals. This compared with only 24.8% in 1977 and 41.7% in 
1980.17 As IMF stabilization policies took hold and subsidies were eliminated 
this situation deteriorated even further. 
During the first half of 1983 the only major conflict provoked by 
constantly rising prices was a nationwide road blockade in response to massive 
hikes in electricity and telephone rates. In the face of an announced 
increase (the third in 18 months) of 92% in electricity rates, large numbers 
of people took to the streets in protest and forced the government to roll 
back rates in June. l8 Curiously, spontaneous neighborhood direct action 
strategies had succeeded where traditionally weak union or class-based popular 
movements had failed in blunting the austerity measures. San Josk's graffiti 
artists rejoiced with the slogan "let the millionaires pay for the crisis." 
Throughout the year, but particularly in its second half, land invasions, 
occasionally involving armed confrontation, were the principal reactions of 
both the urban and rural poor. While the government distributes some food 
assistance to perhaps 40,000 families1' direct action has traditionally been 
the most effective means of solving the other major existential problem of the 
poor: lack of housing in the cities, and lack of tillable land in the 
countryside. 
The housing deficit in the greater metropolitan area of San Josh has 
become legendary, with the government itself characterizing its urban areas as 
11 national emergency disaster zones'' owing to their deficient infrastructure. 
This is the case despite a relatively effective state housing authority 
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(Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanism0 - INVU). Part of the aggravation 
of the housing situation was traceable to the 40% drop in construction 
activity during the crisis of 1982 alone.2o A University of Costa Rica and 
Council of Science and Technology study estimated in 1983 that there was a 
current national housing shortage of 130,000 units, with a further shortfall 
of 125,000 units expected by 1990, when some 40% of the population would form 
part of this "shortfall".21 In response to popular protests, which included a 
January march through San Jos6 and several mass occupations of semi-urban lots 
around the city, the Monge administration promised to build 10,000 new units 
during 1983, at a cost of $31 million and hopefully with Mexican governmental 
assistance.22 At this writing INVU was developing major new projects in the 
traditional public housing areas of Pavas, west of the capital. 
Land invasions in the countryside presented a more serious and dangerous 
problem. The Monge administration's campaign slogan had been a "return to the 
land" and, as one local pundit sarcastically put it, private ranchers' barbed 
wire presented a major obstacle to the program's fullfillment. Costa Rica's 
land tenure system today is as highly inegalitarian as anywhere in Central 
America. Some 44,300 farms comprise only 124,000 hectares, while 11,500 
larger farms monopolize over 2 million hectares. The government's land reform 
and colonization unit (now renamed the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario - IDA) 
had only titled over land to some 16,000 farmers in 22 years, while over 9,000 
cases were "pending for lack of resources. 1123 
Traditionally, the central government responds most rapidly to peasant- 
initiated direct actions, usually non-violent occupation of disputed, or 
simply coveted and uncultivated lands. During 1983 several such occupations 
caused bloody clashes with the police and led President Monge to push for 
legislation, in ~ugust, to authorize the distribution of land to some 10,000 
families.24 The occupations which provoked this move took place in March 1983 
along the southern border region with Panama and led to the death of one and 
the arrest of 300 of the 700 squatters involved.25 In July further violence 
broke out in the region when 800 ex-employees of United Brands seized nine 
company farms in the Coto Valley. 26 Already, in June, President Monge had 
publicly expressed displeasure at the disorder reigning in the administra- 
tion's agrarian policy circles and he charged his Planning Minister to 
investigate to determine why the "return to the land" program was not 
working. In the meantime, the Rural Guard police forces were ordered into the 
fray, with the government responding favorably on an ad hoe basis, as has long 
been its pattern, to squatters' direct action. 
Public sector and urban industrial labor unions were extraordinarily 
quiescent during 1983 and early 1984. Marches and negotiations rarely led to 
strikes, although one was threatened by the powerful 2,000 member Atlantic 
Railroad Workers' Union, backed by the 10,000 members of the Limon Workers' 
Federation, in February 1 9 8 4 . ~ ~  More important were the ongoing negotiations 
between the public employees' unions, headed traditionally by the teachers' 
unions,28 and the State over implementation of the agreed upon "sliding salary 
scale" adjustments of wages, pending since September 1982. This area promised 
to be the focus of serious labor union conflict throughout the remainder of 
1984, Its resolution within the deficit spending limits will obviously be 
critical for the Monge administration in its future dealings with the IMF and 
international creditors. 
Finally, Costa Rica continued to bear an additional cost of the crisis, 
albeit Central American rather than local in this case. During 1983 refugee 
populations had swollen to include an estimated 3,000-5,000 Nicaraguans, 
10,000 Salvadorans, 500 Guatemalans, and 900 Cubans , many in U*N*-su~~Orted 
refugee camps such as the one in TilarAn in Guanacaste Province. 29 However, 
to put this burden in perspective and despite the obvious difference of 
circumstance, one must remember that upwards of 60,000 Nicaraguan refugees 
fled to Costa Rica during the worst fighting against the Somoza dictatorship 
in early 1979. 3 0 
MID-TERM POLITICS: PRECANDIDACIES VERSUS THE "MAGIC FORMULA" 
Although most Costa Ricans consider presidential campaigns overly 
lengthy, indeed that one has not ended before another begins, the major 
national parties only began to gear up for the 1986 race in late 1983 and 
early 1984. If politics is indeed the national pastime, as the "ticos" claim, 
then 1983 was its off-season. 
The ruling National Liberation party and its President, Mr. Monge, have 
maintained a fairly high degree of support despite the economic hard times. 
Monge's favorable opinion index (% positive minus % negative opinion) with the 
public declined from 45 in March 1983, to 39 in July, to 37 in November, to 24 
in March 1984, but he remained the second most popular among recent presidents 
and active national politicians, largely owing to his handling of inter- 
national affairs and his proclamation of Costa Rican neutrality. More 
importantly for the future, fully 44% of those surveyed considered themselves 
Liberaci6n party supporters, compared to the 58% landslide won by the party in 
the 1982 presidential election. Although the announced Liberaci6n precandi- 
dates each did poorly in a hypothetical 1986 race against the leading 
opposition figure, Rafael Angel Calder6n Fournier, this was explainable in 
part as owing to both lesser name recognition and in-party backlash opinion. 
In any event, the margins were not insuperable since the differences were only 
41-29, 41-27, and 37-26, with considerable numbers of uncommitted voters yet 
to decide. 3 1 
Prior to any open politicking among those eligible to run in 1986, there 
had been much ado within Liberaci6n circles regarding a so-called "magic 
formula" to insure party victory in 1986 and reverse the thirty year pattern 
of alternation in power by the party and its opposition. This idea, floated 
by the interested parties it appears, was to reform article 132 of the 
national constitution to allow for presidential reelection, thus allowing the 
highly popular Liberacibnista ex-presidents Jos6 Figueres and Daniel Oduber to 
share an "invincible" ticket. Each of the leaders had previously supported, 
if not orchestrated, attempts at constitutional reform for just this 
purpose. Thus, the "magic formula" was seen as more fantasmographic than 
novel and it failed miserably once again. Figueres' advanced age and Oduber's 
well known political ambitions counterbalanced their recognized talents in the 
eyes of the party faithful, while its precandidates and those of the opposi- 
tion had every reason to oppose any constitutional change. 
Of the three ruling party candidates--Oscar Arias, Alberto Fait, and 
Carlos Manuel Castillo--, the ~arty's Secretary General Arias appears to have 
the inside track to the nomination, through his control of the party machinery 
and the accumulation of past favors. Indeed, of the three, Arias was both the 
most popular within the party and the least successful in the hypothetical 
race against the opposition leader. Arias, thus, is not a figure likely to 
excite either entrepreneurial interests within the party or a mass following 
outside it. A Ph.D. graduate in Political Science in Britain and former 
Minister of Planning (1974-1978), as well as party legislative whip as deputy 
(1978-19821, Arias comes from the leading provincial family of Jleredia. His 
style is extremely reserved and reflective, hardly the stuff for political 
and should he win the nomination it will be owing his "lid 
support among mid-level party cadre rather than among the party's business or 
popular supporters. Arias resigned as Secretary in February 1984 in order to 
campaign full time, as required by party statutes. However, his machinery 
within the party hierarchy remains fully intact and, at present, he appears to 
have a substantial lead over his rivals. 
Alberto Fait, Monge's right hand as First Vice-President and a leader of 
the pro-business wing of the party, will likely provide the most serious 
competition for the nomination. Fait took a leading role in Monge's 
successful campaign for the nomination in 1982 and he has been particularly 
influential on economic policy issues in the current administration. He 
appeals particularly to the party's wealthier segments and their support in 
financing his precandidacy will give a major boost to his efforts. 
The third official Liberaci6n precandidate is Carlos Manuel Castillo, the 
man responsible for the minor miracle of exchange rate stabilization as head 
of the Central Bank. Before resigning in March 1984 to campaign full time, 
Castillo had been one of the government's primary spokesmen on economic policy 
and the renegotiation of the foreign debt. Dr. Castillo, an internationally 
renowned economist, lost to President Monge as a precandidate in the last race 
and his current effort is generally regarded as a long shot at best. The 
party has, of course, officially prohibited open campaigning until a date has 
been set for the early 1985 party nominating convention, but politicking 
continues none the less. 
The opposition, meanwhile, has expended its energies in reorganizing the 
1978 and 1982 "Unidad" coalition format in search of both a new name and a 
more solid ideological base capable of unifying them beyond the election 
campaign itself. Thus, Unidad was officially buried, to be replaced on 
December 17, 1983 by the "Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC)-" This new 
vehicle was made up of the same four opposition parties as before: Democracia 
Cristiana (PDC), Uni6n Popular (PUP), Renovaci6n Democrhtica (PRD), and 
Republican0 Calderonista (PRC), allegedly "fused" together in the new party. 
While all are vaguely "Social-Christian" and slightly right of center, the 
real popular strength remains concentrated in the PRC headed by 35 year old 
Calder6n Fournier, son of the legendary Rafael Angel Calder6n Guardia who 
founded the party while the reformist president in 1940-1944 and whose memory 
yet today provokes strong feelings pro and con. The younger Calder6n was 
Foreign Minister (1978-1982) and ran unsuccessfully against Monge in 1982. He 
is considered by all observers as the virtually certain opposition candidate 
in 1986, although a second loss might prove fatal to even this youthful 
politician's chances of becoming president. 
The PUSC is officially only 50% "calderonista" in its membership and 
officialdom, leaving the other half to the three remaining parties. Some 
analysts have referred to this arrangement, half in jest, as one in which the 
PRC provides the people, the PDC the ideology, the PRD the organizers, and the 
PUP the money. Of these latter three the PUP and PRD offer critical campaign 
support, lapsing back into inactivity thereafter, while the PDC offers the 
only minimally coherent doctrinary umbrella which might lead to an institu- 
tionalized, non-personalist opposition party. At present they all take a back 
seat to the "calderonista" faithful, in all likelihood as much as one-fifth or 
more of the national electorate. 
In June 1984 a date was to be set for the early 1985 opposition national 
convention which would nominated a presidential candidate. However, as has 
usually been the case with the opposition, details were sketchy and while some 
spoke of at least 4,000 delegates to a "National Assembly," it was not clear 
whether this might not be a means of avoiding costly district level 
conventions in the outlying areas of opposition weakness. In any event, the 
outcome did not appear in serious doubt. 
While no competition had yet formally appeared on the horizon for 
Calderbn, those rumored to be eyeing a bid were the presidents of the PRD, 
Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, and the PDC, Jorge Arturo Zamora Monge, as well as 
the ex-Labor Minister under Carazo, GermAn Serrano Pinto. In reality, none of 
these leaders could offer more than token opposition to Calder6n and it 
remains to be seen which of them, if any, would be willing to risk even a 
minimal campaign. Aguilar, a forty year old University history professor, has 
been the legislative whip of the opposition under the Monge administration, 
while the fifty-five year old Zamora and his group make up in ideological 
refinement what they lack in popular support. In either case, no serious 
prospects of victory exist for 1986 and any campaigning on their part would be 
half-hearted, with a view toward perhaps distant future political goals. 
Serrano, so closely identified in the public mind with the Carazo 
administration nightmare, stands even less of a chance. Indeed, the lack of 
any credible challenge within his own party may be a mixed blessing for 
Calder6n. His candidacy may be assured, but maintaining general voter 
interest throughout such a non-contest could be something of a problem later 
in the general election. 3 2 
NEW LEADERSHIP ON THE LEFT 
Perhaps the most sensational political news of 1983 involved the smallest 
party. The pro-Moscow "Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)," leading partner of the 
Left coalition People's Unity (PU) which gained 3% of the 1982 presidential 
vote and 4 of 57 national deputyships, suffered through a succession crisis of 
major proportions at year's end, the fallout from which has Yet to 
settle. 
The removal of Manuel Mora Valverde as Secretary General, and his 
"elevation" to an honorific party presidency after 53 years at the party's 
helm led to repeated conflict from November on. The septegenarian's 
replacement by ex-deputy Humberto Vargas Carbonell was initiated, 
paradoxically, with the drafting of new party statutes at the btraordinary 
Congress called by Mora himself for November 12-13. The creation of a new 
post of president, with which Mora concurred, set the stage for his own 
removal. December 3-4, at its 18th plenary session, the 35 member Central 
Committee "overwhelmingly" accepted these changes and proceeded to replace 
Mora with Vargas Carbonell and, ignoring Mora's protests, appointed him party 
president. However, this overwhelming majority was later reported by Mora 
supporters to have been only a 20 to 15 vote. 33 
Mora Valverde, who at the time was in Nicaragua, left shortly after the 
early December vote for Cuba without making any official statement. He did 
send a letter to the party Central Committee in which he denounced the move, 
resigned the presidency (as did his brother and party Undersecretary General 
Eduardo), and implied that hardliners and hotheads were employing a bureau- 
cratic ruse to deprive him of the leadership which his popularity with the 
party bases would reconfirm at the upcoming XIV Congress September 13-15, 
1984. Consultation with party militants by the new Secretary General 
demonstrated a degree of hostility toward the move and support for Mora, which 
led Vargas to travel to Cuba to meet with the latter in an unsuccessful 
attempt to head off a public division of the party. 3 4 
The major national media, in particular the conservative and stridently 
anticommunist daily La Nacibn, repeatedly suggested, quoting various pro-Mora 
party members, that the change represented the triumph of younger hardliners 
disenchanted with what they considered a "soft and complacent" leadership and 
exploiting both the creation of a new party presidency and the former 
Secretary's advanced age to effect his removal. An intriguing twist to this 
interpretation was added by La Naci6n when its editorial analyst portrayed 
Mora's trip to Cuba, oddly enough, as an attempt to marshal1 the moderating 
influence of Fidel Castro in his favor, against what he considers Soviet- 
backed advocates of anti-U.S. armed adventurism throughout Central America. 
Although Mora has been a faithful Soviet-line spokesman for half a century, 
unlike Vargas he had no first-hand formative experience in that country and 
was known to be working with both Castro and the Costa Rican government toward 
a peace plan for Central America acceptable to the United States. 35 
While Vargas may well represent somewhat more radical party elements, it 
is equally clear that generational conflict alone might have led to such a 
succession crisis. Moreover, the support of the Central Committee majority, 
"overwhelming" or not, and of the party's legislative leader Arnoldo Ferret o 
for Vargas' candidacy indicates something other than a simple "hardline" 
takeover. Vargas played a leading role in party affairs as a deputy from 1978 
to 1982. He and Ferreto were largely ineffective in organizing strike 
activities while deputies in this period, but Vargas was known as a serious 
and capable legislator who played a major role in resolving problems of 
university and public sector finance. In any event, the only official party 
statement in the affair was issued by Ferreto and claimed that there had been 
no internal divisions, no change in policy, no reduction in Mora's powers, and 
that tqe party was the victim of a difamatory publicity campaign which painted 
it as dominated by "hardliners" advocating violence, thus justifying its 
repression. 3 6 
Mora returned from Cuba January 9, 1984 to a political gathering intended 
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to demonstrate his continued popularity within the party. However, successive 
bids by his supporters to regain control of the party, or failing this hold a 
rump convention and be recognized as the official PVP, were unsuccessful, with 
the national Supreme Electoral Tribunal eventually ruling in favor of the 
Vargas-Ferreto position. Barring any reconciliation, difficult to imagine in 
light of the accusations and recriminations already exchanged between the two 
groups, the upcoming September party Congress promises to be an animated 
affair indeed. 
T ERROR1 SM, POLITICS, AND THE "UNARMED" DEMOCRACY 
Since 1981 there have been increasingly frequent terrorist attacks and 
bombings in Costa Rica, most but not all carried out by Central American 
political groups. However, as these outbreaks have become more frequent, and 
as local political differences became caught up in the Nicaraguan border war 
or in crisis-spawned land invasions, the government began to respond by 
beefing up' its no longer miniscule security forces. Although having no 
standing army (with fully 83% of the populace opposed to the creation of one), 
Costa Rica has received some $2 million in U.S. arms aid each of the past two 
years, and recently requested upwards of $10 million f m  1984. 3 7 
Security forces in Costa Rica have grown to include the following: 
"5,000 Civil Guards, the main police force founded after the 
1948 Civil War. Since 1982, mobile Guard 'commands' have been 
organized in strategic areas. The newly formed Chorotega 
Company, now stationed along the northern border, consists of 
184 Guards trained by Costa Rican graduates of the U.S. school 
in the Panama Canal Zone. The Southern Command and the 
Atlantic Command, each with 278 guards, are based near the 
banana plantations in southwestern and eastern Costa Rica. 
. .. There is also a 3,000 member Rural Guard (one of whose 
main functions) is the eviction of peasant squatters. The 
Judicial Police (OIJ), founded in 1973 with 120 employees, now 
has a total strength of 647, 287 of whom are investigators. 
... Other smaller security forces include the National 
Security Agency (ASN) and the Intelligence and Security 
Directorate (DIS), consisting of some 100 officials ... ; the 
Military Police, which has grown to 250 men from 100 in 1977 
and is responsible for patrolling San JosC; and the 
specialized Crime Prevention Unit (UPD). The Organization for 
National hergencies (OPEN) is a paramilitary group created by 
presidential decree in 1982 whose 10,000 members receive four 
hours training each week with obsolete Garand rifles. The 
stated aim of OPEN is to reinforce the Civil Guard in 
emergencies, but ideology clearly plays an important part in 
the organization. Membership requirements include a 'proven 
democratic creed' and, according to vice security minister 
Johnny Campos, leftists are not permitted to join. .. . In 
addition to the official security forces, private paramilitary 
groups are also active. tr38 
Two terrorist actions further inflamed local public opinion during 
1983. The late June dynamiting in San Jose of a car in which two Nicaraguan 
citizens were killed and several on-lookers injured was widely reported to 
have been a bungled attempt at assassinating the ant i-Sandinista leader 
Alfonso Robelo, in coordination with Basque separatists of the ETA. Later, in 
October, the home of the British Ambassador in Costa Rifa was attacked9 
allegedly by ETA militants with the possible collaboration of local fringe 
elements on the Left. By year's end one local daily often known for its 
sensationalism even claimed that a "communist training camp" for terrorists 
was being operated in northern Costa Rica by North Korean and possible ETA 
military personnel.39 Why such a shocking revelation should be relegated to a 
minor notice near the sports pages was not explained, but may well have been 
an indication that the story was based on something less than unimpeachable 
sources. Given this state of affairs it comes as no surprise that as early as 
1982, in a poll commissioned by La Nacibn, some 54.2% of respondents felt 
there was a link between "terrorists and domestic communist groups", without 
any solid proof of such involvement having been presented by the government. 40 
While terrorist acts by exiles in San Josb provided the initial impetus 
for the security buildup, these forces have become involved in other issues 
and areas more directly since then. Indeed, the relative ease with which 
terrorist actions have been investigated and those responsible prosecuted 
belies the need for vastly strengthened security forces. In reality, these 
forces are being expanded today to deal with two interrelated problems: the 
border conflict with Nicaragua and the increasingly frequent land invasions 
throughout the countryside which are met with police force more often and more 
violently than in the past. 
The northern border issue will be dealt with more fully below, but the 
Monge administration was clearly inclined to intervene more directly against 
the contra camps on its border once death-squad style murders of leftist Costa 
Rican citizens and burning and looting of stores owned by contra supporters 
began there about mid-year. 41 The stationing of more security forces in the 
region and the more active interdiction policy followed since late 1983 are 
clearly part of the "neutrality" line espoused by the Monge administration. 
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In this case, the security buildup appears, on the surface, to be aiding the 
neutralist and Left cause. However, major figures in the leadership of the 
regular security forces, as well as the paramilitary OPEN system, in 
particular Vice-Minister of Government and head of the Rural Guard, Enrique 
Chacbn, are widely accused of collaboration with the contra forces led by EdCn 
Pastora. Major Liberaci6n leaders, such as Deputy Miguel Angel Guillen and 
Minister of Public Security, Edmundo Solano Calderh, have denounced such 
collaboration as inconsistent with the administration's professed 
neutrality. 42 Thus, the battle for control over the political role of the 
growing security contingent on the northern border continues, despite over- 
whelming public opposition to the creation of a military force with political 
influence internally. 
As regards the Rural and Civil Guards and their role in expelling 
squatters and repressing strikes in the banana plantation zones, little has 
changed except the size of the problem and the levels of violence associated 
with it. For the first time in some years, a squatter was killed and several 
injured in clashes with the Guard in the south of the country in early 
1 9 8 4 . ~ ~  Such an escalation of both the size of the security forces and their 
use of lethal force bodes ill for the future of a regime no longer even 
talking of a "return to the land" solution to the crisis. 
COSTA RICA' S NEUTRALITY TIGHTROPE ACT 
The Monge administration moved consistently after mid-1983 toward a more 
effectively neutral position vis a vis the Nicraguan border fighting in 
particular, and the Central American crisis in general. This move was opposed 
throughout by the United States and important Rightist elements within Costa 
Rica, and even within the administration itself. This opposition remains 
formidable and determined, placing in doubt the eventual outlines of Costa 
Rican foreign policy. However, as we shall see below, each increase in the 
pressure for an openly rightist, anti-Sandinista policy has led, on the 
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contrary, to an increased resistance to such a change in policy within 
Liberacibn, in orchestration with a similar Mexican response to pressure from 
the North. Thus, the current State Department policy designed to push the 
Monge administration off its "neutrality tightrope act" and into the U.S.- 
Salvadoran-Honduran camp could well backfire as badly as similar plans to, in 
effect, bribe Mexico with financial concessions in order to silence its 
criticism of U.S. Central American policy. 
The developments leading to Costa Rica's declaration of neutrality began 
to appear after May 1983. The high point of anti-Sandinista feeling within 
Costa Rica had been reached in early March when, during Pope John Paul's visit 
to Managua, he was poorly treated in his public appearance. The Pope's use of 
Costa Rica as his overnight base for several of: his one day visits to other,, 
Central American capitals highlighted the "oasis of tranquility" image *Costa 
Ricans are so fond of using in k iqvidi>ous comparisons with their 
neighbors,.and the conservative national press lost no time in portraying the 
Managua debacle as proof of the noxious nature of Sandinismo. However, the 
administration's fears that the border war might eventually make a Lebanon of 
Costa ~ i c a , ~ ~  led to a series of measures designed to rein in the contra 
forces and distance Costa Rica from the Reagan administration line in Central 
America. 
The specific events which helped trigger the attempted crackdown were the 
August airport bombing of Managua by a light plane thought initially to have 
taken off from San Josd, the political killings and riot in Upala along the 
border at this same time, and the early September contra attack on the PeZs 
Blancas border post. Subsequently, ARDE fighters were regularly interned, 
arms confiscated, and leaders either restrained or, occasionally, 
expelled. 45 Nevertheless, despite increased security forces on the border, 
Costa Rica's capabilities against the contras are quite limited, basically to 
harassment and dismanteling of communications facilities. Of greater 
importance is the political shift which this policy implied for any future 
insurgent or U.S. plans for operations. Indeed, some of the most highly 
publicized internments and expulsions were of mercenaries (U.S. citizens and 
Cuban-Americans) recruited in Miami and in transit to the contra camps, 
sending a clear if hardly definitive message to these nationals' 
governments. 4 6 
Once this policy of effective neutrality had been adopted the immediate 
implication was the necessity of a change of foreign ministers. The then 
Minister, Fernando Volio, had missed no opportunity to denounce the Sandinista 
regime as totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist, expansionist, etc, Indeed, his 
rhetorical excesses were often an embarrassment for a regime attempting to 
negotiate with Managua over border difficulties. The similarity between 
Volio's stridently expressed views and those of ex-party leader and ex-Foreign 
Minister Gonzalo Facio, now a leading spokesman for rightist groups in Costa 
Rica, was remarkable in light of the fact that the former purported to 
represent an administration bitterly denounced by the latter. 4 7 
Volio's imminent removal was indicated by informed sources as early as 
August, while he chose to "resign" in November. The earliest public signal of 
this approaching change was President Monge's trip to Mexico without his 
foreign minister in mid-October. While Monge denied there was any signifi- 
cance in  olio's absence, the Mexican press and officialdom correctly 
understood the message being conveyed.18 The ostensible reason for  olio's 
eventual resignation was the United Nations vote cast against the U.S. 
invasion of Grenada by Costa Rica's delegate, allegedly contrary to Volio's 
instructions to him to abstain. However, the vote had been cast on orders 
from the President himself, thus indicating that this resignation was indeed a 
face-saving removal, but a removal none the less. At the same time, the 
National Assembly voted to condemn the U.S. actions, implicitly lending 
further support to Monge's change in foreign ministers. 49  
Following upon this leadership change, Monge proceeded, on November 15th, 
to formally declare Costa Rica's permanent neutrality (transcribed in the 
documents section).50 While first presented to the nation in an Independence 
Day message, September 15th ,51 the neutrality proclamation and its 
reaffirmation in November clearly were an attempt to lay to rest the Volio 
period of confrontationism, and reflected a shift within the Cabinet and party 
away from the U.S. sponsored line. 
Two subsequent efforts were made by the U.S. State Department, in 
coordination with its controversial new ambassador in Costa Rica, Curtin 
Winsor, to enlist the Monge administration in activities alternately termed 
It joint manuevers" and "regional development". However, in both cases the 
clumsiness of the approach has led not only to failure, but increased 
opposition to such cooperation within the administration. In November and 
December a much publicized U.S. offer of several hundred combat engineers to 
build roads and bridges along the northern border was ultimately rejected by 
Monge, who was then forced to ask that the ambassador clarify the issue of 
11 joint manuevers" (Undersecretary Fred Ikle's overzealous characterization of 
the plan) and troop movements. 52 These difficulties were repeatedly 
compounded by the ambassador's proclivity for giving the Costa Rican govern- 
ment advice in public as to both long term solutions to its problems and 
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current policy implementation. This led to the Liberaci6n party directorate 
rebuking him publicly for commenting on internal national affairs,53 while the 
Left had already twice denounced his "interventionism. 1154 
Most recently, border clashes on May 3, 1984, in which Costa Rican 
territory was reportedly shelled by the Sandinista army, led to a renewed 
flurry of exchanges over possible requests for increased U.S. military 
aid.55 Of far greater importance than the arms monies involved ($10 million 
per year for fiscal 1985, versus $2 million currently), the political gains 
sought by the U.S. were revealingly stated in a secret draft report as 
follows : 
It could lead to a significant shift from (Costa Rica's) 
neutrality tightrope act, and push it more explicitly and 
publicly into the anti-Sandinista camp. This could pay 
important political and diplomatic dividends for us. 115 6 
Although Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos JosQ Gutidrrez repeatedly denied 
such a request had been made, or that any U.S. pressure had been brought to 
bear, the Mutual Radio Network quoted unnamed local political leaders to the 
effect that the "pressure had increased ten-fold" on Costa Rica to support the 
U.S. line and accept military aid. 57 They also reported that this pressure 
was leading to a major split with the ruling party. 
Faced with greatly increased border tensions, and pressures both in- 
ternally and externally, the opponents of Costa Rican militarization took to 
the streets May 15th in a massive show of support for continued neutrality and 
the Monge administration's steps ,'to implement it.58 Coincidentally, the 
increased U.S. pressure came just as Mexican President De la Madrid made a 
state visit to Washington, in which he boldly lectured the Reagan administra- 
tion on the error of its ways in Central America. In this context, the 
Mexican-led Contadora group hurriedly put together an agreement, signed by the 
foreign ministers of Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Panama, intended to prevent 
further hostilities which might provide an excuse for heightened tensions or 
any larger U. S. role in Costa Rica. 59 The publicity given during and after 
the Mexican leader's visit to an alleged National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 124, signed by President Reagan ordering the State Department to draw 
up a diplomatic plan to pressure Mexico, through financial and trade 
concessions, into shifting its Central American policy seems likely to insure 
the defeat of such an effort, not only with the Mexican leadership but even 
with states like Costa Rica, more clearly clients of the U.S. to be sure, but 
hardly without domestic critics of any policy too openly or slavishly 
accommodationist. 60 
The byzantine character of contra infighting and U.S.-Costa Rican 
relations regarding these forces was further highlighted by the foiled attempt 
on the life of Ed& Pastora, May 30, 1984, in which one U. S. and one Costa 
Rican journalist and at least one guerrilla fighter were killed, while over 
two dozen were injured. Pastora's followers and the press initially suggested 
that the attempt was the work of opponents of Pastora within ARDE (led by 
Alfonso Robelo) who supported a U.S. sponsored alliance of their group with 
the Somocista-era contra forces of the Frente Democrbtico NicaragGense (FDN) 
fighting along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. Pastora's rejection of such an 
alliance had angered bth Robelo and the CIA, principal advocates of such an 
anti-Sandinista front strategy. Subsequently, both Pastora and President 
Monge implied that the Sandinista regime might have been. behind the attack, 
which Managua vehemently denied. Nevertheless, Monge ordered pas to ra '  s arrest 
while hospitalized and quickly deported him to Venezuela, this intended to 
further prove Costa Rica's neutrality .61 
While Costa Rican leaders welcomed the Kissinger Commission in October 
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1983, submitting grandiose requests for U.S. assistance, experience since then 
has soured a number of them on the prospects for U.S. aid in the short run. 
The likelihood of the commission's recommendations being funded seems far less 
today than at the time of its visit to Costa Rica and, moreover, the price of 
what assistance might be forthcoming is seen as too high politically and 
diplo-matically by much of the ruling party, particularly its more youthful 
elements. If Costa Rica's economic stabilization and recovery remains caught 
up in a tug of war with the IMF, then even more surely its political stability 
is tied up with the Central American crisis and U. S. response. Although the 
internal dynamics of Costa Rican society tend toward compromise and stability, 
the external economic and political contexts could well destroy such a non- 
violent tradition. The ingredients for disaster exist in Costa Rica as 
well. How well Costa Ricans deal with their increasingly limited options 
remains to be seen, but if the recent past is any guide, caution and dialogue 
are likely to be the fundamental weapons. Whether they will prove to be 
effective weapons to counter the militarization of regional life is yet an 
open question. 
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TEXT OF CO STA RICAN NEUTRALTY STATUT E 
"We declare that Costa Rica will observe neutrality in all 
armed conflicts affecting the states of the international 
community, subject to the following: 
Active 
Our neutrality does not imply impartiality in ideological 
and political conflicts in the world. Costa Rica has 
maintained and will continue to maintain the political and 
social concepts it shares with Western democracies. This 
neutrality will not prevent it from actively exercising its 
rights as a member of the United Nations and the OAS in all 
actions aimed at preserving international peace and security, 
except those having military implications; at achieving a more 
just social and economic system in relations among states; and 
at the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Autonomous 
Our neutrality is based on our sovereignty. Our country 
does not recognize the right of any state to interpret the 
consequences of this declaration of neutrality to determine, 
define, or limit our country's foreign policy, either at the 
United Nations and its agencies, at the OAS, or in bilateral 
relations with other states. We ratify the obligations 
imposed on us by international treaties and pacts that we have 
signed, and we request that in the collective security systems 
to which we belong we be freed from participating in military 
actions, which we have not taken Part in for more than 30 
36 
years because we do not have an army. Instead, in those 
situations we have preferred to fulfill our duties through 
humanitarian actions. 
Qualified 
We will not be neutral in the face of the states that are 
guilty of aggression or against which the UN Security Council 
issues preventive or coercive measures. Neither will we be 
neutral with regard to those who attack states to which we are 
committed by virtue of regional collective security systems, 
as provided by Article 53 of the UN Charter, or that exercise 
the right to individual or collective defense, as provided by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Unarmed 
Our declaration of neutrality will not require the 
reestablishment of the army as a permanent institution. The 
country's external security will be based on the collective 
security systems to which it belongs. 
Permanent 
Our neutrality does not refer to a particular conflict or 
a specific region of the world. Neither is it temporary. We 
hope that the decision adopted by the current government will 
be maintained by those who succeed us. For this purpose, we 
are committed to struggle so that this principle, which we 
feel is a natural development of Article 2 of the 
Constitution, will be expressly included in the country's 
Constitution so that it will be permanent. 
We also declare that our government knows and is ready 
f u l l f i l l  t h e  d u t i e s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  t h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n  i nvo lves  
i n  accordance w i th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law, d o c t r i n e ,  and custom. 
On behalf  of t h e  Costa Rican people ,  w e  make known t h i s  
d e c l a r a t i o n  t o  a l l  t h e  member s t a t e s  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
community. We w i l l  be g r a t e f u l  i f  t hey ,  on t h e i r o w n b e h a l f ,  
dec ide  t o  recognize,  suppor t ,  o r  guaran tee  t h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n .  
I ssued  i n  San Jose ,  Costa Rica on 15  September 1983, 162d 
ann ive r sa ry  of t h e  proclamation of our  independence." 
[Signed] Costa Rican P re s iden t  Luis Alberto Monge 
Source: Radio Relo j ,  San Jos6,  15 September 1983; (Foreign 
Broadcast Information Serv ice ,  16 September 1983, pp. 1-4.) 
